

Race, Class, and the Displacement of White Residents from Gentrifying U.S. Neighborhoods*

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Abstract

Are the adverse consequences of gentrification distributed more along racial or class lines? To answer this question, scholars must consider when and where racially dominant groups are affected by gentrification in addition to minoritized groups. Therefore, this study centers White residents displaced from gentrifying U.S. neighborhoods as its analytic focus. Using restricted-access Panel Study of Income Dynamics data between 2001 and 2019, findings show that White displacees shared many demographic characteristics with non-White displacees. White residents were also involuntarily displaced at a rate comparable to that of non-White residents, and both groups were equally likely to move into neighborhoods that were poorer than the ones from which they were displaced. Nevertheless, White displacees earned larger incomes and were displaced from richer neighborhoods. White displacees' wealthier starting points made their downward mobility less dramatic, enabling them to continue living in better-off neighborhoods after displacement. The spatial and financial advantages of White displacees highlight how race and class can be interwoven to mitigate White residents' experiences of displacement in ways that are largely unavailable to non-White residents. Findings support elements of both race- and class-based perspectives of gentrification but ultimately suggest that a blended, race-*and*-class perspective is useful when conceptualizing gentrification-induced displacement.

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Introduction

Are the adverse consequences of gentrification distributed more along racial or class lines? Some scholars define gentrification in terms of class inequality (Glass 2010 [1964]; Hackworth 2002; Smith 1996). For instance, one influential paper states that gentrification is “the replacement of low-income, inner-city working-class residents by middle- or upper-class households” (Hammel and Wyly 1996:250). Other scholars define gentrification in terms of racial inequality, claiming “the general concept of gentrification holds that the people moving in to a gentrifying area are usually White, and the residents who move out are usually people of color” (Kirkland 2008:19; see also Bostic and Martin 2003; Boyd 2008; Golio 2024a). Various scholars attempt to synthesize race-based and class-based logics by invoking perspectives such as racial capitalism (Dantzler 2021; Rucks-Ahidiana 2022) and intersectionality (Kern 2022; Shmaryahu-Yeshurun 2022), yet there is debate over how best to apply these concepts to urban studies (Hopkins 2019; Wacquant 2023).

No matter their approach, many scholars undertheorize the role of race and class in gentrification because they start from the assumption that gentrifiers are comprised of the racially dominant group, such as White people in the United States (Golio 2024a; Kent-Stoll 2020; Mumm 2017). A handful of studies exist on gentrifiers who belong to minoritized groups (Hyra 2008; Moore 2009; Somashekhar 2020) as well as ultra-wealthy elites who “super-gentrify” spaces inhabited by middle-class members of the racially dominant group (Halasz 2018; Lees 2003). Nevertheless, to understand how race and class shape gentrification, scholars must systematically examine members of the racially dominant group who are adversely affected

by gentrification. In the U.S. context, for example, if similar types of White and non-White residents of gentrifying neighborhoods are displaced from their homes, and they are displaced at comparable rates and in similar ways, then displacement is likely more informed by class inequality than racial inequality. If, instead, non-White people bear a disproportionate burden of displacement, then displacement is likely more informed by racial inequality than class inequality.

In the name of disentangling class and race effects during gentrification, this study investigates White residents who were displaced from gentrifying U.S. neighborhoods in the 2000s and 2010s. By comparing White and non-White displacees, I hope to assess whether the harms of gentrification are race-based, class-based, or both. More formally, this study asks two questions:

- 1) Are the White and non-White residents displaced from gentrified neighborhoods demographically similar to one another?
- 2) Once displaced, do White and non-White displacees move into poorer neighborhoods at comparable rates? Or do White displacees end up in better-off neighborhoods than non-White displacees?

Using restricted-access Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 2001 to 2019, this study shows that White and non-White displacees across the United States share many demographic characteristics. Both groups include many renters, unmarried individuals, and recent residents in gentrifying neighborhoods. Both groups also experience a comparable amount of downward spatial mobility, in which they are equally likely to move into neighborhoods that are poorer than the ones from which they were displaced. Nevertheless, White displacees earn larger incomes and are displaced from higher-income neighborhoods. These financial and spatial

advantages make White displacees' downward mobility less severe, enabling them to continue living in wealthier neighborhoods than non-White displacees after being displaced.

This finding helps push scholarship forward in several ways. First, by centering White displacees as a potentially marginalized group, this study acknowledges their existence, something rarely done by studies that equate White people with gentrifiers. Second, this study should encourage scholars of gentrification-induced displacement to avoid the reductionism of a purely race- or class-based argument. The application of a blended, race-*and*-class perspective can reveal the ways that race and class mutually co-constitute one another during the gentrification process. Third, by going beyond the inequalities that distinguish gentrifiers from longtime residents, this study highlights how, even during the act of being displaced, White residents hold advantages over non-White residents. White displacees have larger incomes, start out in richer neighborhoods, and end up in richer neighborhoods than do non-White displacees. Put another way, although this study cannot claim to be a direct empirical test of the racial capitalism perspective of gentrification (Bloch and Meyer 2023b; Mumm and Sternberg 2023; Rucks-Ahidiana 2022), the study complements the racial capitalism perspective by showing how the economic harms of gentrification are distributed in ways that enable White displacees to preserve their economic and spatial privileges over non-White displacees. Finally, beyond lessons for academics, this study complicates the work of journalists who express concern that the housing shortage in many U.S. cities has displaced members of the White middle class (Kamisher and Carson 2023; Kusisto 2016). White displacees may continue living in middle-class neighborhoods after being displaced, or at least end up in better-off neighborhoods than non-White displacees. I expand on these conclusions in the last part of the paper.

Race, Class, and Gentrification-Induced Displacement

There is considerable debate over the nature of displacement and its connection to gentrification (Brown-Saracino 2017). Some scholars claim that displacement is at the core of how gentrification unfolds (Newman and Wyly 2006; Slater 2006). Others believe gentrification can occur without displacement (Ellen and O'Regan 2011; Freeman and Braconi 2004; McKinnish, Walsh, and White 2010). To complicate matters further, displacement can come in many forms, such as cultural displacement (Hyra 2015), affective displacement (Bloch and Meyer 2023a), or exclusionary displacement (Marcuse 1985). Scholars even debate how to accurately define and measure displacement (Carlson 2020). For the purposes of this study, I define displacement as physical displacement, “the involuntary movement of people from their place of residence” (Zuk et al. 2018:34). Other studies of gentrification-induced displacement rely on a similar definition (Delmelle and Nilsson 2020; Freeman et al. 2024; Martin and Beck 2018).

Displacement can cause tremendous social upheaval (Atkinson 2004), forcing people into poverty (Desmond and Bell 2015) and breaking apart communities (Betancur 2011). While gentrification may not always lead to displacement, and displacement does not exclusively occur in gentrifying neighborhoods (Hepburn, Louis, and Desmond 2024), much gentrification results in displacement. Scholars have identified several factors that increase one's risk of being displaced. Renters, for instance, are often at higher risk of displacement than homeowners, the former of whom can be at the mercy of potentially exploitative landlords (Martin and Beck 2018; McCabe 2016). Low-income people have also been associated with displacement because they cannot afford to stay in neighborhoods where housing costs and property taxes are rising (Hwang and Ding 2020; Zuk et al. 2018). For similar reasons, less-educated and working-class residents

also have higher displacement rates than highly educated and middle-class residents (Atkinson 2000; National Institute for Advanced Studies 1981). Elderly and female-headed households, who are more economically marginal compared to younger and male-headed¹ households, are at elevated risk of displacement as well (Bondi 1991; Henig 1981; Hepburn, Louis, and Desmond 2020). Finally, smaller households are often more likely to be displaced than larger households, the latter of which can draw on more sources of income (Atkinson 2000).

Race has an unclear status in the displacement literature. Evidence is mixed as to whether displacement outcomes are racially stratified. For instance, McKinnish, Walsh, and White (2010) find that non-White households are no more likely than White households to be displaced, but Zuk et al. (2018) and Hwang and Ding (2020) highlight Black residents' greater risk of displacement compared to non-Black residents. In another paper, Freeman et al. (2024) argue that displacement rates differ between White and Black households but not between White, Latinx, and Asian households. Lee and Perkins (2023) suggest these mixed findings may be due to variation across city or metropolitan contexts, for which few existing studies account. Lee and Perkins (2023) also emphasize that the field cannot draw strong conclusions regarding displacement because only a handful of studies analyze where displacees end up moving to, making it difficult to assess the importance of racial inequality to displacement.

Despite the growing body of literature on race and displacement, two aspects of the phenomenon have thus far been ignored. First, who among the racially dominant group ends up being displaced? Many studies have analyzed inter-racial differences in gentrification and displacement (Hwang and Ding 2020; Lee and Perkins 2023; Somashekhar 2020), and others have examined intra-racial variation among minoritized groups (Bostic and Martin 2003; Hyra 2008; Moore 2009). Few gentrification studies, however, investigate intra-racial variation within

the White population in the United States (Brown-Saracino 2009; Parker and Ternullo 2024). Second, because the literature on where displacees move is substantially smaller than the literature on the causes of displacement (Freeman et al. 2024; Hwang and Ding 2020; Lee and Perkins 2023), the gentrification literature says little about what happens to members of the racially dominant group after they are displaced. After displacement, do White displacees move to neighborhoods comparable to the ones they left, or do they move to worse-off neighborhoods? For many reasons, it is necessary to center White residents displaced from gentrified neighborhoods as an object of inquiry.

Comparing White and Non-White Residents Displaced from Gentrifying U.S. Neighborhoods

The remainder of this study aims to describe which kinds of White people are displaced from gentrified U.S. neighborhoods, and what their destination neighborhoods are. In addition, the study tests predictions regarding how displacement outcomes may differ between White and non-White displacees. My hypotheses are rooted in three theoretical orientations: a class perspective, a race perspective, and what I call a race-and-class perspective.

The Class Perspective

Displacement, by many definitions, occurs when wealthier residents displace poorer residents (Glass 2010 [1964]; Hackworth 2002; Hammel and Wyly 1996; Smith 1996).² Wealthier folks moving into poorer neighborhoods can cause rents, home prices, and property taxes to increase, making it more expensive for low-income residents to remain in the neighborhood. Landlords sometimes deliberately raise rents to force low-income people out of the neighborhood and make room for wealthier residents (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2021),

and developers regularly rehabilitate properties in poorer neighborhoods so those properties can be bought or rented by wealthier residents (Stein 2019). Whereas gentrification in the United States was once concentrated in White neighborhoods (Zukin 1987) and eventually expanded to include non-Black neighborhoods (Hwang and Sampson 2014), gentrification now happens in neighborhoods of all racial compositions (Freeman and Cai 2015; Huante 2021). These facts suggest the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1a: According to a class perspective, White and non-White residents are equally at risk of displacement.

Hypothesis 2a: According to a class perspective, White and non-White displacees are equally likely to experience downward spatial mobility. In other words, after they are displaced, White and non-White displacees are equally likely to move into a neighborhood whose median household income is lower than the neighborhood they left.

The Race Perspective

A strain of gentrification literature starts from the assumption that gentrifiers are White people and displacees are non-White people. For instance, a systematic review of the gentrification literature between 1970 and 2019 states,

In many of the quantitative studies, a series of regression models were set up in which Whiteness was a predictor of gentrification and displacement, and the presence of Black and Hispanic residents was indicative of ungentrified areas. This use of race in quantitative models reinforces the a priori assumption that gentrified spaces are White spaces (Fallon 2021:13).

One such study operationalized gentrification as “the number of whites replacing blacks in central-city housing.” The author claimed, “it is reasonable to expect that blacks are disproportionately outmovers and whites disproportionately in-movers in the renovation process” (Spain 1980:382-383). If gentrification is operationalized as the presence of White people in a

neighborhood, it renders White displacees invisible. Studies that take displacees' destination neighborhoods into account are more sensitive to the racial complexities of gentrification-induced displacement. At the same time, they tend to either use race as a control variable (Freeman et al. 2024; Lee and Perkins 2023) or group White displacees along with other types of displacees in their analyses (Hwang and Ding 2020). Such research designs, in effect, contribute to the invisibility of White displacees. Because a collection of studies either equate White people with gentrifiers or use research designs that conceal White displacees from view, I test the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1b: According to a race perspective, non-White residents are at risk of displacement, but White residents are not.

Hypothesis 2b: According to a race perspective, non-White displacees experience downward spatial mobility, but White displacees do not.

The Race-and-Class Perspective

Inspired by Korver-Glenn, Dantzer, and Howell's call for "urban sociologists to reckon with race-and-class (instead of race-or-class) in future research" (2021:12), I offer a blended, race-and-class perspective of gentrification-induced displacement. The race-and-class perspective draws on multiple theoretical traditions, such as intersectionality (Kern 2022; Shmaryahu-Yeshurun 2022) and Du Boisian sociology (Du Bois 1899; Golio 2024b), yet it aligns most strongly with a racial capitalism perspective (Dantzer 2021; Robinson 1983; Rucks-Ahidiana 2022). According to racial capitalism, White people hold economic advantages over non-White people because markets, cities, and even empires rely on racism and economic exploitation to preserve the privileges of White people and maintain the disadvantages of non-

White people. In the context of displacement, for example, when the U.S. highway system was erected in the middle of the 20th Century, both White and non-White people were displaced from their homes to make room for highway construction. “Housing opportunities for displaced white tenants were more plentiful than housing options for nonwhites,” however, “because displaced whites could qualify for federally insured mortgage loans to buy a suburban home. Or, their whiteness allowed them to rent a home in a higher-opportunity neighborhood” (Dickerson 2021:1544).

Today, legally sanctioned racial segregation has been outlawed, but there are still ways in which racism and economic exploitation work together to protect White people’s spatial and financial advantages over non-White people. Appraisers value White people’s homes more highly than they do non-White people’s homes (Howell and Korver-Glenn 2018), realtors promote White neighborhoods as desirable places to live while steering non-White home seekers away from White neighborhoods (Besbris 2020; Korver-Glenn 2021), more economic development occurs in White rather than non-White communities (Somashekhar 2020), and banks specifically target non-White communities when offering subprime mortgages (Rugh and Massey 2010; Taylor 2019).

Housing market mechanisms like these may mitigate the extent and severity of displacement among White residents, ensuring that White displacees do not suffer as much downward mobility as do non-White displacees after being displaced. This assertion suggests the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1c: According to a race-and-class perspective, both White and non-White residents may experience displacement, but non-White residents have a higher probability of being displaced.

Hypothesis 2c: According to a race-and-class perspective, both White and non-White displacees may experience downward spatial mobility, but non-White displacees are more likely to move into neighborhoods with a lower median household income.

Data

To test this paper's hypotheses, I rely on restricted-access data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 2001 and 2019. The PSID is a biannual panel survey³ that is nationally representative of people in the United States. During each wave of the PSID, surveyors follow up on the same family. The survey began in 1968, and the initial sample included approximately 5,000 families. Today, that sample has grown to almost double that amount. The original 1968 sample was crafted of native-born respondents only, but the PSID added an immigrant sample to the survey starting in the late 1990s.

The PSID includes self-reported information on each family's composition, income, and dwelling characteristics as well as each head of household's race, gender, and age. The survey also asks whether heads of household were displaced from their home after the previous survey wave, the operationalization of which I will discuss later in the paper. In my analysis, I use the restricted-access version of the PSID data set, which combines the information above with the Census tract in which each respondent lived. Restricted-access data allow one to track respondents' moves across neighborhoods over time. Many studies use restricted-access PSID data to investigate the spatial mobility patterns of people displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods (Delmelle and Nilsson 2020; Freeman et al. 2024; Martin and Beck 2018).

For this study, I merge PSID information on wave-to-wave residential mobility with information on Census tracts from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2006-2010 and 2015-2019

American Community Survey 5-year estimates. I use Census tracts as a proxy for respondents' neighborhoods, and I harmonize Census tract boundaries across time using the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014). I linearly interpolate Census information between time periods when necessary. All monetary values are inflated to 2019 values. Although PSID data existed prior to 2001, I start the study in 2001 because the gentrification of non-White neighborhoods in the United States became more commonplace starting in the 2000s (Ellen and Torrats-Espinosa 2019; Freeman and Cai 2015).

The final analytic sample includes 5,193 heads of household spread across 17,775 person-years. Using survey-weighted data, 45 percent of the sample identified as non-Hispanic White, 35 percent identified as non-Hispanic Black, 16 percent identified as Hispanic, two percent identified as non-Hispanic Asian, and two percent identified with another racial category.⁴ The PSID's bias toward White and Black households is well-known because the initial sample only included native-born households (Pfeffer, Fomby, and Insolera 2020). Others have also noted the potential for selection bias in PSID data because respondents are overrepresented in certain kinds of neighborhoods, such as suburban ones (Makarewicz, Dantzler, and Adkins 2020). Nevertheless, the PSID is one of the most detailed and comprehensive data sets available for the measurement of gentrification-induced displacement.

Variables

Measure of Gentrification

To ensure that trends found in gentrifying neighborhoods were unique, I compare them to trends in neighborhoods that could have gentrified but did not during the study period. I call the former group of neighborhoods *gentrifying* and the latter group *not gentrifying*. To identify each

set of neighborhoods, I first limit the analysis to neighborhoods that were potentially gentrifiable at the beginning of the study period, in 2001. Following Freeman (2005), a potentially gentrifiable neighborhood must have had a median household income below the surrounding metropolitan area's median household income at the outset of the study period.⁵ Also at the outset of the study period, that neighborhood must have had a share of housing built within the last 20 years that was below the surrounding metropolitan area's median share. A *gentrifying* neighborhood must have been potentially gentrifiable at the start of the study period. In addition, by the end of the study period, in 2019, a gentrifying neighborhood must have also (a) experienced a change in its share of college-educated residents greater than the median change in the surrounding metropolitan area, and (b) experienced an increase in its real median housing value. If a potentially gentrifiable neighborhood did not meet these latter criteria, then I treat it as *not gentrifying*.

I rely on Freeman's (2005) operationalization of gentrification because it is perhaps the most commonly used demographic operationalization of gentrification in the literature (Delmelle and Nilsson 2020; Freeman et al. 2024; Martin and Beck 2018; Pearman 2023). Nonetheless, results are robust using other operationalizations of gentrification such as that of Ding, Hwang, and Divringi (2016) or Ellen and Torrats-Espinosa (2019). Appendix A shows core regression results using these latter operationalizations of gentrification, and they mirror findings in the main body of the paper.

Measure of Displacement

When testing how displacement was associated with White rather than non-White residents, the outcome of interest is an indicator for whether a respondent reported that they were

involuntarily displaced from their home since the previous wave of the survey. This measure comes from the PSID question, “Why did the respondent move?” If the respondent answered either “Purposeful consumptive reasons--contraction of housing: less space; less rent” or “Response to outside events (involuntary reasons): HU coming down; being evicted; armed services, etc.; health reasons; divorce; retiring because of health,” then I consider them displaced. Although this measure is imperfect, it is among the best quantitative measures of displacement currently available in a survey that is nationally representative of the United States. Many studies of gentrification-induced displacement use this approach to measure displacement in the U.S. (Delmelle and Nilsson 2020; Freeman et al. 2024; Martin and Beck 2018; Pearman 2023).⁶

In addition, this measure withstands several tests of reliability. Among the reasons for moving that are typically unassociated with displacement, only two percent of respondents served in the armed forces, and 1.8 percent got divorced from one survey wave to the next. Removing these individuals from the analysis does not change the results. Furthermore, the average age of displacees was far younger than retirement age, as will soon be shown. Few respondents I treat as displaced likely retired because of health.

Measure of Downward Spatial Mobility

To measure whether displacees experienced downward spatial mobility, I use a binary indicator for whether, in the current survey wave, the respondent (a) lives in a new neighborhood, and (b) their new neighborhood’s median household income is lower than the median household income of the neighborhood they left. As defined, someone need not live in a gentrified neighborhood to experience downward spatial mobility from one survey wave to the next.

Analytic Strategy

Probability of Displacement

To test Hypothesis 1, I use the linear probability model below.⁷

$$D_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 W_i + \beta_2 V_i + \beta(W * V)_i + T_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

D represents whether, in the following survey wave, respondent i will report that they were involuntarily displaced. W indicates whether the respondent identified as White rather than non-White,⁸ and V represents a matrix that includes common predictors of displacement such as one's *income*,⁹ *age*, *renter status* (i.e. whether or not one rents their home), *marital status* (i.e. whether or not one is married), *parental status* (i.e. whether or not one has children), *gender* (i.e. female or male), as well as the *number of years the respondent has lived in the neighborhood*. All these characteristics affect one's financial security, likelihood of eviction, rootedness in one's community, and ability to continue living in a gentrified neighborhood after being displaced (Hepburn et al. 2020; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2007; McCabe 2016).

Excluding any interaction variables, Equation (1) tests whether White residents had a different probability of displacement than did non-White residents, controlling for common predictors of displacement. After testing this association, I include a set of interaction variables ($W * V$), which interact being White with each predictor of displacement in V . The coefficients on ($W * V$) indicate whether each predictor of displacement was exceptionally associated with White residents' probability of displacement. For example, if White elderly residents were displaced at greater rates than non-White elderly residents, then the interaction between age and being White will detect this association. T is a time fixed effect to account for time-invariant heterogeneity across respondents. ε is the error term. Standard errors are clustered within respondents to

account for the possibility that each respondent was displaced in more than one wave of the survey.

I run Equation (1) twice, once among residents of gentrifying neighborhoods, and once more among residents of neighborhoods that could have gentrified but did not. By examining residents in both sets of neighborhoods, I can infer how distinct the predictors of displacement were in gentrifying rather than not gentrifying neighborhoods.

Probability of Downward Spatial Mobility

To test spatial mobility outcomes, I use the linear probability model below, again doing the analysis separately for respondents living in gentrifying and not gentrifying neighborhoods.

$$M_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 W_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 (W * D)_i + \beta X + T_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

M indicates whether respondent i will experience downward spatial mobility between the current and the next survey wave, meaning they will move into a poorer neighborhood in the next survey wave. W represents whether the respondent identified as White rather than non-White. D indicates if a respondent will report that they were displaced in the next survey wave. $(W * D)$ is the key independent variable of interest, whether White displacees had a different probability of downward spatial mobility than did non-White displacees. X represents a series of control variables including income, age, renter status, marital status, parental status, gender, and number of years the respondent has lived in the neighborhood. T and ε are the same as in Equation (1). As in Equation (1), standard errors are clustered within respondents.¹⁰

Results

Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for displaced and not displaced individuals broken out by race and the gentrification status of neighborhoods where respondents lived. Regardless of race or gentrification status, displacement rates were roughly comparable across groups, ranging from eight to 10 percent, supporting literature that claims gentrification is not associated with exceptional rates of displacement (Ellen and O'Regan 2011; Freeman et al. 2024; McKinnish et al. 2010). Within the White population, the average displacee tended to be younger, a renter, and have fewer years in their neighborhood. This finding highlights the heterogeneity that existed among White residents of gentrified neighborhoods. At the same time, the average non-White displacee was similarly younger, a renter, and had fewer years in their neighborhood. White and non-White residents displaced from gentrified neighborhoods had comparable rates of downward spatial mobility as well (31 to 27 percent, respectively).

[Table 1]

Thus far, summary statistics show that White and non-White displacees shared many similarities. The two groups were nonetheless different in important ways. Regardless of gentrification or displacement status, White residents started the study period in higher-income neighborhoods and had more income themselves, which follows historical racial wealth disparities between White and non-White people in the United States (Dantzler, Korver-Glenn, and Howell 2022). Even when just analyzing displacees, White residents' wealth advantages remained. The average White displacee started out in a neighborhood with a median household income of \$57,067, while the average non-White displacee started out in a neighborhood with a median household income of \$45,165. The average White displacee also earned more than

double the amount of income (\$43,035 to \$19,629, respectively). Displacees may have been collectively disadvantaged by gentrification, yet White displacees started out in a more financially and spatially advantageous position. These disparities will be important to consider when examining the regression models to come.

Disparities between White and non-White displacees may suggest that each group lived in different regions of the country. PSID data are nationally representative but not regionally representative, so the data cannot conclusively determine whether region of the country explained racial disparities among displacees. Despite that caveat, Table 2 breaks up the neighborhoods from which White and non-White residents were displaced by metropolitan area. The table suggests that many White and non-White displacees lived in the same metropolitan areas. Five of the top ten metropolitan areas that contributed White and non-White displacees to the data set were the same. More to the point, the intraclass correlation of a null hierarchical regression model predicting displacement at both the individual and metropolitan levels yields a value of only 0.02. In other words, only two percent of the variance across probabilities of displacement was attributable to metropolitan-level differences. Even more, in supplemental analyses, when I model regressions hierarchically and include control variables for population (logged), percent White, and median household income at the metropolitan level, results change little.¹¹ Differences across respondents and neighborhoods explained most of the variance in probabilities of displacement, not metropolitan contexts. Therefore, in regression models presented in the next section, I do not include random intercepts for metropolitan areas or cluster errors by metropolitan area.

[Table 2]

Regression Results

Table 3 shows linear probability models that test associations between displacement and being White. Models are done separately for residents of gentrified neighborhoods and residents of neighborhoods that could have gentrified but did not. Model (1) upholds other studies that found renting, being poor, and being newer to one's neighborhood increased one's probability of being displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods (Coulton, Theodos, and Turner 2012; Hepburn et al. 2020; Zuk et al. 2018). Model (3), however, shows that many of these associations were not unique to gentrified neighborhoods. Regarding race, White residents had a lower probability of being displaced from gentrified neighborhoods than did non-White residents, but this finding did not reach statistical significance. This finding suggests that being White had little effect on risk of displacement. Regressions that interact race with common predictors of gentrification-induced displacement further uphold this fact, as shown in Model (2). Table 3 gives little credence to the notion that non-White residents are more vulnerable to displacement than White residents, or that different types of White and non-White residents end up displaced.

[Table 3]

Table 4 displays linear probability models that regress the probability of downward spatial mobility on being displaced and being White. According to Models (1) and (3), regardless of gentrification status, displacees had a higher likelihood of experiencing downward spatial mobility than did non-displacees. Models (1) and (2) also suggest that, among residents of gentrified neighborhoods, being White did not significantly alter one's probability of downward spatial mobility. Instead, being younger, childless, a renter, and newer to one's neighborhood increased a respondent's probability of downward spatial mobility. Models (2) and (4) include an interaction variable for being White and being displaced, which constitutes the key independent

variable of interest. White displacees from gentrifying neighborhoods had a 4.6 percent lower probability of downward spatial mobility than did non-White displacees, but these results did not reach statistical significance. One cannot rule out the hypothesis that, in gentrifying neighborhoods, White and non-White displacees were equally likely to experience downward spatial mobility. In neighborhoods that could have gentrified but did not, however, White displacees were statistically more likely than non-White displacees to avoid downward spatial mobility, as seen in Models (3) and (4). In summary, Table 4 provides little evidence that White and non-White residents of gentrifying neighborhoods move to poorer neighborhoods at different rates.

[Table 4]

Combining results from summary statistics and regression analyses, the data provide contrasting findings. Regression models showed that White and non-White residents of gentrified neighborhoods had equal probabilities of being displaced and experiencing downward spatial mobility. Yet, summary statistics showed that White displacees started out in richer neighborhoods and had more income than did non-White displacees. How can these two facts be reconciled? Figure 1 presents an answer to this question. The figure shows the average income¹² of origin and destination tracts for White and non-White displacees who experienced downward spatial mobility. Many White and non-White displacees experienced downward spatial mobility, but White displacees started out in richer neighborhoods and ended up in richer neighborhoods. In fact, at \$47,373, the average income of White displacees' destination neighborhoods was higher than the average income of non-White displacees' origin neighborhoods. Gentrification appears to embed White and non-White displacees in different sets of neighborhoods, on average, with the former group starting out and ending up in richer neighborhoods, and the latter

group starting out and ending up in poorer ones. Put another way, White displacees' financial and spatial advantages tended to mitigate the severity of displacement in ways that were unavailable to many non-White displacees.

[Figure 1]

Contextual Analyses

Before one can use this study to assess how race and class shape gentrification and displacement, the study must first answer several additional questions. First, should the non-White category be refined into its constituent racial categories? Second, given historical wealth disparities between White and non-White people in the United States, would it be more effective to compare non-White displacees to low-income White displacees only rather than all White displacees? Third, how robust are the findings when the study period is shortened or lengthened? Gentrification can occur quickly or slowly (Beauregard 1990), and the use of varying time windows addresses how gentrification-induced displacement can occur in waves (Miller 2020). Fourth, despite substantial rates of downward spatial mobility, is it possible that displacees cashed out and moved into more valuable homes in poorer neighborhoods? Finally, how did racial and class inequality influence the neighborhood attainment patterns of displacees who experienced upward rather than downward spatial mobility? Appendix B answers each of these questions in turn, all the while upholding the robustness and overall conclusions of the main body of the paper.

Discussion and Conclusion

Scholars debate whether the adverse consequences of gentrification are distributed more along racial lines, class lines, or both (Fallon 2021; Golio 2024a; Kirkland 2008; Rucks-Ahidiana 2022; Smith 1996). To help settle the debate, this study focused its lens on White residents who were displaced from gentrified U.S. neighborhoods between 2001 and 2019. Findings showed that White and non-White residents of gentrifying neighborhoods were just as likely to be displaced, predictors of displacement were similar between the two groups, and members of both groups were equally likely to move into poorer neighborhoods after being displaced. White displacees, however, started out in higher-income neighborhoods and earned more income than did non-White displacees. In fact, among displacees who moved into poorer neighborhoods after being displaced, the average White displacee ended up in a richer neighborhood than the one the average non-White displacee left.

Taken as a whole, findings support elements of both race- and class-based perspectives of gentrification and displacement, ultimately suggesting that a blended, race-*and*-class perspective is useful when conceptualizing gentrification-induced displacement. Going against the race perspective, displacement did affect White residents in addition to non-White residents, making conceptualizations that reduce White people to gentrifiers and non-White people to the victims of gentrification overly simplistic. Nevertheless, going against the class perspective, White displacees held clear spatial and financial advantages over non-White displacees. Because White displacees started out in richer neighborhoods and had larger incomes than non-White displacees, their experience of displacement was less dramatic and likely less traumatic.

While this study is not an empirical test of racial capitalism, its race-and-class perspective complements racial capitalism's contention that gentrification unfolds in ways that preserve

White privilege, and that prior experiences of dispossession and disinvestment in neighborhoods where non-White people live results in additional disadvantages for non-White people (Dantzer 2021; Fluri et al. 2022; Mumm and Sternberg 2023; Rucks-Ahidiana 2022). The findings also complement intersectional approaches that highlight how the victims of gentrification are often impacted by multiple forms of inequality (Kern 2022; Shmaryahu-Yeshurun 2022). The harms of gentrification are distributed in nuanced ways that belie simplistic labels such as “the working class” or “racial minorities.” Finally, this study complements the work of demographers who demonstrate that Black displacees have worse spatial mobility outcomes than do non-Black displacees in the United States (Hwang and Ding 2020; Zuk et al. 2018). All else equal, White displacees’ mobility outcomes fit a pattern in which White residents end up living in higher-income neighborhoods than do Black residents.

Beyond implications for academic research, this study addresses journalistic concern that, as housing becomes more unaffordable in U.S. cities, members of the White middle class are being displaced (Kamisher and Carson 2023; Kusisto 2016). There is no question that the housing affordability crisis in the United States is impacting the middle class (Schuetz 2022). Nevertheless, when members of the White middle class are displaced, they are more likely than non-White people to start out in richer neighborhoods and earn higher incomes. White displacees may consequently experience downward mobility, but they are likely to continue living in middle-class neighborhoods after being displaced, or at least end up in more advantaged neighborhoods than are non-White displacees.

Future research can build on this study’s findings to address its shortcomings. This study suggested that regional differences between where White and non-White displacees lived were largely inconsequential. PSID data, however, are not well-suited to capture local-level variation

in gentrification experiences. The PSID is nationally representative but has too few respondents in any one city to be locally representative. Future research can do more to account for local-level differences in experiences of displacement, which other studies suggest may be important to consider (Lee and Perkins 2023). Additionally, PSID data cannot speak to the lived experience of displacement among White displacees. White displacees may be richer than non-White displacees and start out living in higher-income neighborhoods, but White displacees' day-to-day experience of being displaced may be just as hard for them to endure. There is room for qualitative research to investigate White displacees as systematically as my quantitative study did. A growing body of literature, in fact, provides fitting examples of how to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to investigate gentrification and displacement (bunten, Preis, and Aron-Dine 2024; Easton et al. 2020). Furthermore, it is possible that the White people displaced from gentrified neighborhoods were once gentrifiers themselves. Studies of super-gentrification discuss early-wave White gentrifiers who end up being displaced as gentrification continues (Halasz 2018; Lees 2003). Such a possibility does little to change this study's findings, but future research should build on this study to address how the displacement of White residents fits into the multi-wave nature of gentrification in cities. In addition, this study failed to address how people do not always have equal access to the amenities in their own neighborhood, especially when their race or class background is incongruent with others who live nearby. Whether residents stay in place or are displaced, their access to local institutions such as schools, playgrounds, or restaurants can vary in ways that PSID data cannot reveal. Finally, this study is unable to determine how specific the race-and-class perspective of gentrification-induced displacement is to the U.S. context. Gentrification scholars are fortunately expanding the scope of gentrification research beyond racial and class categories established in the Global North

(Fluri et al. 2022; Valle 2021), and I encourage scholars to examine how race and class interact to produce displacement in other parts of the world.

Notes

1. To the author's knowledge, no study to date has compared the displacement rates of women and men to non-binary people.
2. Social class can be defined by more than the distinction between wealthier and poorer residents (Atkinson 2023). This paper relies on an income-based notion of class, which is imperfect but common to quantitative studies of gentrification (Dragan, Ellen, and Glied 2019; McKinnish et al. 2010).
3. Prior to 1997, the PSID was an annual survey.
4. Very few respondents reported as multiracial, so this analysis focuses on first race mentions only. Also, only 1.3 percent of respondents changed racial identification over the study period. Removing these individuals from the data set does little to change the results.
5. Results are upheld if gentrifiable neighborhoods had a median household income below the 40th or 60th percentile of metropolitan area income.
6. This measure of displacement may mask differences in the involuntary nature of mobility between White and non-White residents displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods. Nevertheless, few differences existed in White and non-White displacees' mobility intentions. Sixty-three percent of White displacees and 60 percent of non-White displacees reported they might move over the next couple of years, suggesting that mobility intentions did not bias findings that relied on this measure of displacement.
7. All conclusions are identical when using logistic regressions. I report linear probability models for ease of interpretation and because my analysis relies on interaction variables, which are difficult to interpret in generalized linear models.

8. In robustness checks reported later in the paper, I refine the non-White category into its constituent groups.

9. The PSID measures a head of household's family income rather than their individual income.

In this study, all mentions of income refer to one's family income.

10. Supplemental analyses that included a control variable for subprime lending rates in neighborhoods did little to change the main results.

11. These results are available from the author.

12. More accurately, the figure presents the mean of neighborhoods' median household incomes within each group.

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
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Figure 1. Average Incomes of Displacees' Origin and Destination Neighborhoods, by Race



NOTE. This figure provides the mean of neighborhoods' median household incomes within a given category. Values are specific to displacees who experienced downward spatial mobility.

Table 1. Summary Statistics, by Gentrification Status, Race, and Displacement Status

	Gentrified				Not Gentrified			
	White		Non-White		White		Non-White	
	Displaced	Not Displaced	Displaced	Not Displaced	Displaced	Not Displaced	Displaced	Not Displaced
<i>Tract Characteristics</i>								
Median Household Income	\$57,067	\$56,179	\$45,165	\$45,913	\$44,808	\$45,058	\$37,507	\$37,367
of Origin Tract ¹	(\$24,457)	(\$17,945)	(\$17,584)	(\$16,912)	(\$16,094)	(\$11,557)	(\$12,347)	(\$12,619)
Moved to a Lower-Income Tract	31.31 (46.38)	7.86 (26.92)	26.94 (44.37)	9.51 (29.33)	20.71 (40.53)	5.61 (23.02)	32.45 (46.82)	9.04 (28.68)
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>								
Income ²	\$43,035 (\$2,880 - \$170,935)	\$62,832 (\$0 - \$922,608)	\$19,629 (\$0 - \$190,777)	\$38,778 (\$0 - \$457,943)	\$33,120 (\$228 - \$496,000)	\$47,040 (\$0 - \$1,032,669)	\$21,486 (\$0 - \$246,172)	\$33,480 (\$0 - \$987,700)
Age ¹	40.18 (18.21)	46.80 (17.94)	45.21 (17.20)	46.60 (16.67)	46.18 (20.80)	51.40 (18.37)	42.04 (15.21)	46.69 (15.83)
Renter	81.41 (38.91)	48.33 (49.97)	82.33 (38.14)	61.07 (48.76)	70.63 (45.55)	37.33 (48.37)	82.16 (38.29)	55.32 (49.72)
Married	17.39 (37.91)	39.92 (48.97)	23.39 (42.34)	27.93 (44.86)	19.38 (39.53)	34.09 (47.40)	23.89 (42.64)	36.89 (48.25)
Female	40.22 (49.04)	27.19 (44.49)	54.01 (49.85)	52.21 (49.95)	44.85 (49.74)	41.08 (49.20)	47.49 (49.94)	47.09 (49.92)
Has Children	8.46 (27.83)	15.11 (35.81)	34.06 (47.40)	30.8 (46.17)	16.27 (36.91)	18.09 (38.50)	37.17 (48.33)	39.71 (48.93)
Years in Neighborhood ²	2 (0 - 26)	6 (0 - 26)	2 (0 - 24)	6 (0 - 26)	2 (0 - 20)	6 (0 - 26)	2 (0 - 26)	6 (0 - 26)
Displacement Rate	8.01		10.08		8.31		9.77	
N _{Unweighted}	111	1,275	262	2,147	150	1,655	745	6,877
N _{Weighted}	3,217	39,848	3,328	27,500	4,128	53,001	8,457	76,409

NOTE. The table includes percentages unless noted otherwise. All summary statistics are survey-weighted.

1. This row presents a mean instead of a percentage.
2. This value is logged in regressions, so this row presents medians and ranges.

Table 2. Top 10 Metropolitan Areas Where Displacees from Gentrified Neighborhoods Lived, by Race

White			Non-White		
Metropolitan Area	Weighted N	Weighted %	Metropolitan Area	Weighted N	Weighted %
1. Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue	247	7.67	Chicago-Naperville-Elgin	499	15.00
2. San Diego-Carlsbad	235	7.31	Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale	346	10.39
3. New York-Newark-Jersey City	206	6.40	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington	243	7.31
4. Denver-Aurora-Lakewood	197	6.13	New York-Newark-Jersey City	216	6.49
5. Boston-Cambridge-Newton	147	4.56	St. Louis	157	4.71
6. Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale	145	4.51	Lexington, KY	136	4.09
7. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach	130	4.05	Fresno, CA	105	3.15
8. Washington D.C.-Arlington-Alexandria	128	3.97	Richmond, VA	104	3.13
9. Chicago-Naperville-Elgin	106	3.31	Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington	95	2.86
10. Lexington, KY	87	2.69	Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue	81	2.45
N_{MSAs}		52	N_{MSAs}		57
$N_{Unweighted}$		111	$N_{Unweighted}$		262
$N_{Weighted}$		3,217	$N_{Weighted}$		3,328

NOTE. For confidentiality reasons, this table omits unweighted Ns within each metropolitan area.

Table 3. Linear Probability Models Regressing Displacement on Being White

	Gentrified		Not Gentrified	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.019)
ln(Income)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Renter	0.046*** (0.011)	0.042** (0.013)	0.050*** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.008)
Married	0.003 (0.014)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.010)
Female	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.009)
Has Children	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.008)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.036*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.004)
White x ln(Income)		-0.010 (0.010)		-0.001 (0.007)
White x Age		0.001 (0.001)		0.003 (0.010)
White x Renter		0.006 (0.023)		0.010 (0.019)
White x Married		0.013 (0.029)		-0.023 (0.020)
White x Female		0.051 (0.031)		-0.007 (0.022)
White x Children		-0.010 (0.023)		0.026 (0.018)
White x ln(Yrs in Neigh)		0.002 (0.012)		0.013 (0.008)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.288*** (0.061)	0.057** (0.021)	0.127*** (0.027)	0.069*** (0.013)
N	3,202	3,202	8,081	8,081

NOTE. ‘Gentrified’ refers to residents of gentrified neighborhoods. ‘Not Gentrified’ refers to residents of neighborhoods that could have gentrified during the study period but did not.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4. Linear Probability Models Regressing Downward Spatial Mobility on Being Displaced and Being White

	Gentrified		Not Gentrified	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Displaced	0.177*** (0.028)	0.185*** (0.034)	0.177*** (0.018)	0.192*** (0.020)
White	-0.021 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.016* (0.007)
Displaced x White		-0.027 (0.061)		-0.101* (0.044)
ln(Income)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Age	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Renter	0.068*** (0.012)	0.069*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.007)	0.056*** (0.007)
Married	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
Female	0.011 (0.015)	0.011 (0.015)	0.010 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)
Has Children	-0.026* (0.013)	-0.027* (0.013)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.008)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.144* (0.058)	0.143* (0.057)	0.235*** (0.032)	0.234*** (0.032)
N	3,187	3,187	8,037	8,037

NOTE. ‘Gentrified’ refers to residents of gentrified neighborhoods. ‘Not Gentrified’ refers to residents of neighborhoods that could have gentrified during the study period but did not.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix A. Regression Analyses Using Different Operationalizations of Gentrification

	Ding et al. (2016)		Ellen and Torrats-Espinosa (2019)	
	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility
White	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.022 (0.016)
Displaced		0.209*** (0.028)		0.215*** (0.041)
White x Displaced		-0.041 (0.045)		-0.065 (0.073)
ln(Income)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Renter	0.054*** (0.010)	0.054*** (0.009)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.043** (0.014)
Married	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.009 (0.018)
Female	-0.023 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.030 (0.019)	0.011 (0.017)
Has Children	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.016)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.007*** (0.001)
White x ln(Income)	-0.004 (0.007)		-0.015 (0.013)	
White x Age	0.000 (0.001)		0.0004 (0.001)	
White x Renter	-0.010 (0.017)		-0.004 (0.027)	
White x Married	0.005 (0.021)		-0.001 (0.034)	
White x Female	0.023 (0.022)		-0.009 (0.035)	
White x Children	0.000 (0.017)		-0.009 (0.026)	
White x ln(Yrs in Neigh)	0.010 (0.008)		0.008 (0.015)	
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.064*** (0.017)	0.225*** (0.046)	0.062** (0.024)	0.084 (0.061)
N	5,733	5,700	2,172	2,154

NOTE. Main analyses rely on Freeman's (2005) operationalization of gentrification, but this table uses the operationalizations of Ding et al. (2016) as well as Ellen and Torrats-Espinosa (2019) to show that core results are similar no matter the operationalization used.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B. Contextual Analyses That Uphold the Main Results

This section answers five questions that may complicate the findings from the main analyses. First, should the non-White category be refined into its constituent racial categories? Second, is it more effective to compare non-White displacees to low-income White displacees only rather than all White displacees? Third, how robust are the findings when the study period is shortened or lengthened? Fourth, is it possible that displacees cashed out and moved into more valuable homes in poorer neighborhoods? Fifth, how did racial and class inequality influence the neighborhood attainment patterns of displacees who experienced upward rather than downward spatial mobility?

Appendix Table B1 breaks out the non-White category into its three largest components – non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic Asian – and reruns regressions comparing each of these three groups to non-Hispanic Whites. Results change little when White residents are compared to each of these groups. White residents continue to have no statistically different risk of displacement, and few types of White residents are at statistically notable risk of displacement either. Likewise, White displacees are at no greater or lesser risk of downward spatial mobility than non-White displacees. A key difference is that, now, White residents who were not displaced are 3.1 percent less likely than Black residents who were not displaced to experience downward spatial mobility. White residents who were not displaced are also 6.8 percent more likely to experience downward spatial mobility than Asian residents who were not displaced. Despite these differences, results regarding displacees remain intact.

Appendix Table B1. Regressions Comparing White to Black, Hispanic, and Asian Residents

	Risk of Displacement			Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility		
	White vs. NH Black	White vs. Hispanic	White vs. NH Asian	White vs. NH Black	White vs. Hispanic	White vs. NH Asian
White	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.028 (0.085)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.068** (0.021)
Displaced				0.187*** (0.038)	0.147 (0.081)	0.210 (0.233)
White x Displaced				-0.030 (0.061)	0.013 (0.096)	-0.053 (0.239)
ln(Income)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.054)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Renter	0.050*** (0.015)	0.031 (0.037)	0.056 (0.055)	0.073*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.067*** (0.021)
Married	0.014 (0.021)	-0.049 (0.045)	0.043 (0.153)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.006 (0.024)
Female	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.070 (0.041)	-0.157* (0.074)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.023)	0.004 (0.027)
Has Children	-0.015 (0.016)	0.021 (0.041)	-0.114 (0.135)	-0.024 (0.014)	-0.049** (0.018)	-0.035** (0.019)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)		-0.010** (0.003)		-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
White x ln(Income)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.025 (0.055)			
White x Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)			
White x Renter	0.004 (0.025)	0.022 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.058)			
White x Married	-0.004 (0.031)	0.064 (0.050)	-0.029 (0.154)			
White x Female	0.041 (0.032)	0.090 (0.049)	0.179* (0.078)			
White x Children	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.045 (0.045)	0.090 (0.136)			
White x ln(Yrs in Neigh)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.015 (0.010)			
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.042 (0.023)	0.122* (0.049)	0.067 (0.086)	0.151* (0.061)	0.234* (0.120)	0.118 (0.150)
N	2,780	1,458	1,218	2,766	1,451	1,212

NOTE. These regressions are limited to residents of gentrified neighborhoods.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix Table B2 reruns regressions dropping all high-income White residents from the data set. The data set now excludes all White respondents who earned more than \$43,035, the median income of White displacees from gentrified neighborhoods. Even when comparing low-income White residents to all non-White residents, key associations remain intact. The only difference is that now, for every additional year one lives in their neighborhood, a White resident has a 4.8 percent lower probability of being displaced from a gentrified neighborhood than does a non-White resident. Despite this one change, no other characteristic made a White respondent more or less likely to be displaced or experience downward spatial mobility.

Appendix Table B2. Regressions Comparing Non-White to Low-Income White Residents Only

	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility
White	-0.006 (0.044)	-0.028 (0.018)
Displaced		0.178*** (0.034)
White x Displaced		0.011 (0.085)
ln(Income)	-0.016** (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
Age	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.005)
Renter	0.042** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.013)
Married	0.002 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.017)
Female	-0.028 (0.017)	0.012 (0.017)
Has Children	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.030 (0.016)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.045*** (0.007)
White x ln(Income)	0.007 (0.015)	
White x Age	0.001 (0.001)	
White x Renter	-0.044 (0.042)	
White x Married	0.037 (0.054)	
White x Female	0.073 (0.044)	
White x Children	-0.013 (0.061)	
White x ln(Yrs in Neigh)	-0.042* (0.020)	
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.047* (0.022)	0.184** (0.062)
N	2,378	2,367

NOTE. These regressions are limited to residents of gentrified neighborhoods.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Next, Appendix Table B3 replicates key regression results when the 2001-2019 study period is shortened to 2001-2009 or 2011-2019 as well as lengthened to 1991-2019. Results are no different for the shorter periods, but in the 1991-2019 period, White displacees now have a 16.7 percent lower predicted probability of downward spatial mobility than do non-White displacees. There are likely three reasons why the addition of the 1990s now generates a significant difference in each group's rate of downward spatial mobility. First, when expanding the data set to include the 1990s, White displacees become a more exclusive group. In the 1991-2019 data set, White displacees' average income and origin neighborhood's median household income were respectively \$45,144 and \$61,893, while in the 2001-2019 data set these figures were respectively \$43,035 and \$57,067. Second, the U.S. housing market was far more stable in the 1990s, a decade that avoided the housing crisis and Great Recession of the 2000s and 2010s (McCabe and Rosen 2023). Finally, gentrification accelerated in the 21st Century, with larger numbers of neighborhoods affected in the 2000s than in the 1990s (Maciag 2015). Taken together, White and non-White displacees' potential for downward spatial mobility likely became more similar after 2000 due to increased housing market volatility and an expansion in the pool of residents potentially impacted by gentrification. Although the inclusion of the 1990s in the data set alters the findings slightly, it does little to change overall conclusions from the analysis.

Appendix Table B3. Regressions Using Different Time Windows

	2001-2009		2011-2019		1991-2019	
	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility	Risk of Displacement	Risk of Downward Spatial Mobility
White	0.004 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.035 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.011)
Displaced		0.106* (0.042)		0.259*** (0.056)		0.252*** (0.037)
White x Displaced		0.072 (0.080)		-0.134 (0.096)		-0.161** (0.059)
ln(Income)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.000 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Renter	0.038* (0.016)	0.063*** (0.015)	0.072** (0.022)	0.030 (0.019)	0.033** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.011)
Married	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	-0.048* (0.024)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)
Female	-0.033 (0.020)	0.017 (0.019)	0.005 (0.027)	0.035 (0.024)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)
Has Children	0.005 (0.017)	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.047* (0.023)	0.014 (0.022)	-0.028* (0.012)	-0.030* (0.012)
ln(Yrs in Neighborhood)	-0.054*** (0.010)	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.026* (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.042*** (0.006)
White x ln(Income)	-0.019 (0.015)		-0.001 (0.008)		-0.008 (0.010)	
White x Age	-0.001 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	
White x Renter	0.002 (0.032)		0.009 (0.043)		0.003 (0.018)	
White x Married	-0.002 (0.037)		-0.021 (0.056)		0.010 (0.022)	
White x Female	-0.033 (0.034)		0.015 (0.059)		0.040 (0.025)	
White x Children	-0.006 (0.029)		-0.026 (0.041)		0.029 (0.018)	
White x ln(Yrs in Neigh)	0.018 (0.015)		0.023 (0.022)		0.003 (0.010)	
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.080*** (0.024)	0.185* (0.077)	0.074* (0.031)	0.113 (0.059)	0.007 (0.016)	0.195*** (0.055)
N	2,028	2,022	1,101	1,096	3,991	3,969

NOTE. These regressions are limited to residents of gentrified neighborhoods.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Regarding the possibility that displacees who were downwardly spatially mobile cashed out and moved into more valuable homes in poorer neighborhoods, it is unlikely that this occurred. By far, downwardly spatially mobile displacees' most common move was from renting to renting. Seventy-one percent of White displacees and 64 percent of non-White displacees started out and ended up as renters. Only five percent of White displacees and seven percent of non-White displacees transitioned from homeownership to homeownership, and four percent of White displacees and seven percent of non-White displacees transitioned from renting to homeownership. Among homeowners, moreover, the average White displacee's new house was worth \$20,536 more than their original house, and the average non-White displacee's new house was worth \$20,663 more than their original house. None of these housing tenure transitions were so notable to suggest that displacees cashed out, or that large numbers of downwardly spatially mobile displacees moved into more valuable homes in poorer neighborhoods.

Finally, in addition to the 31 percent of White displacees and 27 percent of non-White displacees who experienced downward spatial mobility, 19 percent of White displacees and 23 percent of non-White displacees continued living in the same neighborhood after being displaced. That leaves 50 percent of White displacees and 50 percent of non-White displacees who experienced upward spatial mobility, meaning they moved into a richer neighborhood after being displaced. When examining these upwardly spatially mobile displacees, the advantages of White displacees come into clearer view. On average, a White displacee who was upwardly spatially mobile moved into a neighborhood that was \$38,960 richer than their former neighborhood, while a non-White displacee who was upwardly spatially mobile moved into a neighborhood that was only \$18,079 richer than their former neighborhood. Taking this finding alongside others presented earlier, White and non-White residents of gentrified neighborhoods

were just as likely to be displaced and experience downward spatial mobility. Whether they were downwardly or upwardly mobile, however, White displacees ended up in richer neighborhoods than their non-White counterparts. This fact provides further evidence of White spatial and financial advantages during the act of displacement.